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Abstract
From French data, this paper uses a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach combined
with propensity score matching to identify the eﬀect of an exogenous change in employ-
ment protection among older workers on ﬁrm’s incentives to provide training. Laying
oﬀ workers aged 50 and above, French ﬁrms have to pay a tax to the unemployment
insurance system, known as the Delalande tax. In 1999, the measure was subjected to
a reform that increased due taxes but that did not concern equally all ﬁrms. We ﬁnd
that this exogenous shock to employment protection for older workers substantially
rises ﬁrms’ incentives to train the 45-49 age group of workers. This result conﬁrms
predictions of the simple labor market model we develop in a ﬁrst stage.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J14, J24, J26
Keywords: Older workers, employment protection, ﬁrms’ training incentives.
1 Introduction
It is widely known that employment rates in OECD countries considerably diﬀer in age
due to large age-diﬀerences in labor market ﬂows1. In particular, employment rates of
older workers are low before the retirement age. This is a common characteristic to OECD
countries, whatever the retirement age in force. Faced with these low employment rates of
older workers, some countries have experimented with speciﬁc older worker employment
protection in the form of higher ﬁring taxes and subsidies on hiring (see OECD [2006]).
In Belgium, Finland, France, Japan, Korea and Norway, it is indeed more costly for ﬁrms
to lay oﬀ older workers because of longer notice periods or higher severance pay2. Speciﬁc
P.-J. Messe: University of Le Mans (GAINS-TEPP)
yB. Rouland: University of Le Mans (GAINS-TEPP), Faculté de droit et de Sciences Économiques,
Avenue Olivier Messiaen, 72085 Le Mans Cedex 9 - e-mail : benedicte.rouland@univ-lemans.fr
zWe are grateful to Francois Langot for thoughtful comments and suggestions. We also thank Francois-
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participants at the 2011 CNRS thematic school “Public Policies Evaluation”, JMA 2011 meeting, Journées
LAGV 2011 and seminar participants at EPEE (Evry) and GAINS (Le Mans), with a special mention to
Jean-Olivier Hairault. The usual disclaimer applies.
1The hump-shaped age-dynamic of employment in OECD countries reﬂects the age-dynamic of labor
market ﬂows, characterized by U-shaped inﬂow rates to unemployment (ﬁring rates) and age-decreasing
hiring rates.
2To compensate for age discrimination, governments in most European countries have also put speciﬁc
inactivity and disability programs in place that provide generous substitution incomes until retirement.
Finally, some countries have experimented with speciﬁc subsidies to increase the likelihood for older workers
to ﬁnd a job (UK, USA).
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older worker employment protection should foster long-term relationships between older
workers and employers3. For instance, Schnalzenberger and Winter-Ebmer (2009) show
that an age-speciﬁc ﬁring tax caused a substantial reduction in layoﬀs for older workers
in Austria. A similar regulation for France has been analyzed by Behaghel, Crépon and
Sédillot (2008). The authors show that the most stringent schedule of this tax following
the 1999 reform (change that is under consideration in this paper) led to decrease sizeably
layoﬀs of older workers in large ﬁrms.
In this paper, we examine a case of speciﬁc older worker employment protection and
look at its eﬀect on ﬁrms’ training incentives, which obviously raises speciﬁc age issues.
Chéron, Hairault and Langot (2011) argue that the shorter distance to retirement (known
as the “horizon eﬀect”) is the key point for understanding the economics of older workers
employment. This view is supported by empirical evidence on micro-data (see Hairault,
Langot and Sopraseuth (2010)). Our work absolutely ﬁts with these concerns. It is widely
known indeed that training incidence is a function of age (Bassanini et al. (2007)). This
is most related to a distance to retirement issue since the present value of net returns to
human capital investments in older employees is lower due to the shorter period during
which both employees and employers can reap the beneﬁts of these investments. From a
natural experiment in The Netherlands, Montizaan, Cörvers and De Grip (2010) show that
a decrease in pension rights postpones expected retirement and then increases participation
in training courses among older employees (although exclusively for those employed in large
organizations). From an equilibrium search model supported by an estimation based on
French data, Khaskhoussi and Langot (2008) show that a short distance to the retirement
age explains the low investment in training of elderly.
In this paper, using individual data, we try to properly identify the eﬀect of stricter
employment protection among older workers on ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in ﬁrm speciﬁc-
skills. Speciﬁcally, we study the impact of the 1999 French Delalande tax change. Since
its introduction in 19874, French ﬁrms have to pay a tax to the unemployment insurance
system laying oﬀ workers aged 50 and above, known as the Delalande tax5. The amount of
the tax is proportional to the worker’s gross wage at the time of layoﬀ. Since 1992, ﬁrms
are exempted from the tax for workers hired after the age of 50 if they are laid oﬀ later on.
It is only due if the worker is employed under a permanent contract and only the private
sector is concerned. The 1999 change resulted in an increase in the tax schedule for ﬁrms
with more than 50 workers. This rise in the tax was implemented in a context of rapidly
growing employment that beneﬁted all categories of workers, except older unemployed
workers. Table 1 shows how the amount of the tax has varied after the reform.
As the Delalande tax increases the ﬁring cost of workers aged 50 and above, it comes to
an age-increasing ﬁring tax. Therefore, we have to account for the fact that employment
protection may have an age-diﬀerentiated impact. In particular, Chéron et al. (2007) study
the eﬀect of introducing an additional tax when laying oﬀ older workers (near retirement
3The general conclusion reached in the large literature on employment protection legislation is that
employment protection measures do not have a signiﬁcant impact on steady-state employment, but are
likely to inﬂuence the dynamics of employment (see Young (2003) for a review). More precisely, with
fewer job terminations and less job creation, EPL is known to reduce inﬂows into unemployment and
outﬂows from employment, while also lowering outﬂows from unemployment and inﬂows into employment.
However, this indirect negative eﬀect of employment protection on the overall employment rate does not
concern older workers as their hiring rate is very low. Therefore, only the direct eﬀect on ﬁring rates
matters regarding older workers.
4Since January 2008, the Delalande tax no longer exists.
5The threshold-age was 55 in 1987 but was lowered to 50 after the 1992 reform.
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Table 1: Delalande tax schedule according to the age of the laid oﬀ worker (monthly gross
wage)
Worker’s age
50 51 52 53 54 55 56-
57
58 59
Jan. 1993-Dec. 1998 All ﬁrm sizes 1 1 2 2 4 5 6 6 6
Since Jan. 1999 More than 50 employees 2 3 5 6 8 10 12 10 8
Less than 50 employees 1 1 2 2 4 5 6 6 6
Source: Behaghel, Crépon and Sédillot (2008), legislative texts.
Notes: For each age group, the table displays the tax due by the ﬁrm to the unemployment insurance
system if it lays a worker oﬀ. The tax is a function of previous wages, and is stated in months of growth
wages.
age) by extending the theory of job creation and job destruction to account for a ﬁnite
working life-time6. As far as our paper is concerned, two conclusions can be drawn. First,
the authors show that the introduction of the tax reduces ﬁrings of workers concerned
by the tax while, on the contrary, the ﬁring probability of workers who are below from
the threshold-age of the tax increases. Indeed, the value of job continuation in the latter
case is reduced because of the expected ﬁring tax due in the last period of working life
(in case of layoﬀ), while retirement allows ﬁrms to avoid it. Anticipating the tax, ﬁrms
increase layoﬀs before being subject to the tax while it is in their best interest to keep
older workers on working in the last period of working life. Second, the authors provide
a quantitative analysis of the “Delalande Tax”. Higher ﬁring costs after 557 are found to
lead to better employment protection for the 55-59 years-old (who beneﬁt from an increase
in the employment rate of 4.2 points) but to negatively aﬀect the employment rate for
workers aged 45-54 (decreases by 2.7 points). These ﬁndings are consistent with the study
of Behaghel et al. (2008). A higher level of the tax indeed deterred ﬁrms from laying older
workers oﬀ.
The 1999 Delalande tax change led to increase ﬁring taxes diﬀerences in age terms
by tightening employment protection of workers employed in large ﬁrms and aged 50 and
above. To our knowledge, no paper has already studied the eﬀect of an employment
protection speciﬁc to older workers on ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in training. In light of
these theoretical considerations, this seems to be an important concern. The approach
and the key results we obtain can be summarized as follows. First, we develop a simple
model of the labor market with both endogenous ﬁring and training decisions, and where
dismissals in the last period of working life (above a threshold-age) are subject to a ﬁring
tax. The impact of this tax on ﬁrm’s incentives to engage in training particularly depends
on the way it aﬀects ﬁring decisions in the last period as ﬁrms anticipate this tax. In
particular, job destructions of older workers decrease while ﬁrings of younger workers rise.
Accordingly, we show that the ﬁring tax has no eﬀect on older workers training but only
may rise the training incidence of younger workers. The reason is that the age-speciﬁc
ﬁring cost plays on the future expected returns but older workers will be retired in the next
6The equilibrium of such models is typically featured by increasing (decreasing) ﬁring (hiring) rates
with age, and a hump-shaped age-dynamics of employment.
7The calibration in Chéron et al. (2007) is based on the period before the 1992 tax reform. Therefore,
the threshold-age above which ﬁrms are liable for the Delalande tax is 55 in their study while it is 50 in
ours.
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period. Further, we show that ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in training (for workers below
the threshold-age) also depend on the arrival rate of idiosyncratic productivity shocks
and on the initial job productivity: the lower the persistence of shocks, the higher ﬁrms’
incentives. This comes from a complementarity eﬀect between job destructions and training
investments (see Chéron and Rouland (2011)): training investments ensure a higher job
value by increasing workers’ productivity, which in turn reduces the risk of layoﬀ that would
become too costly at the last period of working life due to the tax. Conversely, in the event
of persistent productivity shocks, this complementarity eﬀect that leads to protect matches
against future bad productivity shocks no longer matters. The eﬀect of the ﬁring tax on
training only rests on a simple productivity eﬀect that determines whether the tax aﬀects
the probability that the job will be robust to ageing. Therefore, age-speciﬁc ﬁring costs
may have no impact on training incidence, particularly considering high productive jobs
for which the job is initially robust. Accordingly, the lower the initial productivity, the
more likely the tax has an eﬀect on ﬁrms’ training incentives.
Empirical estimations on French data allow us to quantify these eﬀects. In particular,
we take advantage of the change in the Delalande tax schedule in 1999 to propose a reliable
identiﬁcation strategy based on the exogenous increase in the costs of laying older workers
oﬀ. Indeed, we study employment protection reform in a case where the law explicitly
treats workers diﬀerently depending on the ﬁrm size they work in. In particular, we
use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD hereafter) approach combined with propensity score
matching to compare older workers training rates in small and large ﬁrms, before and
after the reform. By doing so, we are able to consistently estimate the average treatment
eﬀect on the treated, eliminating time-invariant biases between the treated sample and
the comparison group sample due to mismatch related to ﬁrm size and diﬀerences in the
measurement of the dependent variable. Once observable and unobservable factors are
controlled for, we ﬁnd a substantial eﬀect of stricter employment protection on ﬁrms’
incentives to train workers, but only signiﬁcant for the 45-49 age group. In particular, the
training rate of these workers is increased by 11.5 points of percentage in large relative
to small ﬁrms after the reform. As expected, the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant for workers aged
between 50 and 54. Finally, we show that the treatment eﬀect appears to be greater among
less productive jobs, suggesting that the evolution of technology is not so rapid.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we develop the theoretical model. Section
3 presents data and associated descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the identiﬁcation
strategy and the results obtained through DiD speciﬁcations. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Qualitative analysis: A simpliﬁed theoretical model
2.1 Model environment
We study the theoretical implications of older workers employment protection on ﬁrms’
incentives to engage in training in the following simpliﬁed environment. We consider a two-
period, discrete time model in which older workers exit the labor market at the exogenous
age T , perfectly known by employers. The last period of working life before retiring is
denoted T   1 and the next to last period T   2. Apart from age i 2 [T   2; T   1], there
is no other heterogeneity across workers. The economy is in steady-state and we do not
allow for any aggregate uncertainty.
A productive unit is the association of one worker and one ﬁrm who are already
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matched8. The productivity of a worker is the sum of a random component " and a
deterministic one yi(ki), derived from training investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills during
both periods ki9. Lastly, at any age, workers earn an exogenous wage b.
The time of events and of decisions is as follows. First, at the beginning of the period,
an idiosyncratic productivity shock may hit jobs at Poisson rate . If that is the case, a
new job productivity  is drawn in the general distribution G() with  2 [0; "], and the
ﬁrm has then no choice but either to continue production or to terminate the job for a
zero return and dismisses the worker. Dismissals of workers aged T   2 implies no speciﬁc
cost while a ﬁring cost F has to be paid when a ﬁrm ﬁres a worker of age T   1. In
this way, we account for a speciﬁc older workers employment protection, experimented
in many OECD countries10. Firms decide to close down any jobs which productivity is
below an (endogenous) productivity threshold denoted Ri(ki) that depends on the invested
amounts in training. The job destruction rate is then determined by G(Ri(ki)). Second,
ﬁrms decide on the investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills ki that determines both the human
capital of workers for the period yi(ki) and their overall human capital level11. There is
no human capital depreciation and skills are all allowed to accumulate between the two
periods. Precisely, yT 2 = yT 2(kT 2) and yT 1 = yT 1(kT 2; kT 1).
2.2 Firms’ decisions
Firing decision For a ﬁrm, the intertemporal value of a ﬁlled job depends both on
the worker’s human capital yi(ki) and on the idiosyncratic component ". We denote this
value by J i(ki; "). Further, there is no future expected proﬁt in the value of JT 1(ki; )
as the worker will retire in T . We assume that ﬁrms pay all the training cost C(ki)12.
Corresponding Bellman equations for T   1 and T   2 satisfy, respectively:
JT 1(kT 2; kT 1; ") = yT 1(kT 2; kT 1) + "  b  C(kT 1) (1)
JT 2(kT 2; ") = yT 2(kT 2) + "  b  C(kT 2)| {z }
instantaneous proﬁt
+ 
"Z "
RT 1(kT 2;kT 1)
JT 1(kT 2; kT 1; x)dG(x)  FG(RT 1(kT 2; kT 1))
#
| {z }
expected proﬁt in T   1 if new shock
+ (1  )maxfJT 1(kT 2; kT 1; ); Fg| {z }
expected proﬁt in T   1 if the shock lasts
(2)
8As we only focus on training and ﬁring decisions of ﬁrms, we do not account for the hiring process.
Therefore and for the sake of simplicity, we consider associations already productive.
9The additive form of the output of the match we assumed between an endogenous component (yi(ki))
and another exogenous one (") clearly simpliﬁes calculations but also ﬁts the usual deﬁnition of training.
Usually, training is considered as a way to improve workers’ skills. Without training, workers are still
able to produce but at lower productivity levels. To mention only a few, Lechthaler (2009) and Belot,
Boone and van Ours (2007), within the framework of endogenous human capital and productivity shocks,
consider an additive form of the output of the match as well.
10We could also have formalized a speciﬁc older worker employment protection by considering ﬁring
costs due at any age but a higher tax for the last period of working life.
11The function yi(ki) is supposed strictly increasing and concave, with y(0) = 0.
12with C0(0) = 0, C0(ki) > 0 and C00(ki) = 0.
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Integrating by parts
R "
RT 1(kT 2;kT 1) J
T 1(kT 2; kT 1; x)dG(x) in equation (2) leads toR "
RT 1(kT 2;kT 1)(1   G(x))dx   F

1 G(RT 1(kT 2; kT 1))

. Therefore, equation (2)
comes to :
JT 2(kT 2; kT 1; ") = yT 2(kT 2) + "  b  C(kT 2)
+ 
"Z "
RT 1(kT 2;kT 1)
(1 G(x))dx  F
#
+ (1  )maxfJT 1(kT 2; kT 1; ) + F; 0g  (1  )F (3)
The endogenous job destruction rule leads to a reservation productivityRT 1(kT 2; kT 1)
in T   1 deﬁned by JT 1(kT 2; kT 1; RT 1) =  F as a ﬁring cost has to be paid at this
period. On the other hand, the reservation productivity RT 2(kT 2; kT 1) in T   2 is de-
ﬁned by JT 2(kT 2; RT 2) = 0 as dismissals do not imply any cost. Therefore, the ﬁring
cost F has an opposite eﬀect on RT 1(kT 2; kT 1) and on RT 2(kT 2; kT 1). It leads to
reduce the job destruction ﬂow in T  1 while it increases it in T  2. As argued by Chéron
et al. (2011), the reason is that it is in the best interest of ﬁrms in T   1 to wait for the
imminent retirement age that allows them to not to be subject to the tax. This is the
labor-hoarding eﬀect of ﬁring costs. On the opposite, in T   2, ﬁrms anticipate the future
ﬁring tax and increase dismissals. This is the perverse anticipation eﬀect of age-speciﬁc
ﬁring costs. And the higher the ﬁring cost, the more extensive these eﬀects. In addition,
training investments improve job tenure increasing future productivity gains. In particular,
the higher the option value of ﬁlled jobs (expected gains in the future) depending on the
training investments, the weaker the job destructions.
RT 1(kT 2; kT 1) =  yT 1(kT 2; kT 1) + b+ C(kT 1)  F (4)
RT 2(kT 2; kT 1) =  yT 2(kT 2) + b+ C(kT 2) + F
  
Z "
RT 1(kT 2;kT 1)
(1 G(x))dx
  (1  )maxfJT 1(kT 2; kT 1; RT 2) + F; 0g (5)
Training investment decision Firms choose how many ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills they invest
in, in order to maximize the net expected value of a ﬁlled job. It follows that the investment
decision in T   2 is stated as:
max
ki0
J i(ki; ") =) C 0(ki) = J1(ki; ") (6)
In this way, ﬁrms decide on the sum they invest in speciﬁc training so that the expected
marginal return on investment is equaled to its marginal cost. The marginal return depends
on present and future expected proﬁts. In T   1, the expected value of a ﬁlled job only
depends on the instantaneous proﬁt as workers retire in T . But the expected proﬁt in T 1
is also determined by the training investment carried out in T   2. Therefore, let denote
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kT 1 = (kT 2)13 the optimal investment decision rule in T  1 conditionally to kT 2 that
results from:
C 0(kT 1) = yT 12 (kT 2; kT 1) (7)
If the job productivity drawn in T 2 lasts in T 1 (with probability 1 ), the job also
does if JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); )   F , which occurs with probability P (JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); )+
F  0). This is the probability that jobs will be robust to ageing since the job destruc-
tion rule changes in T   1 following the introduction of the ﬁring tax14. By increasing
productivity in T   1, the training investment in T   2 aﬀects not only the expected job
value in T   1, but also this probability. Therefore, max
kT 20
JT 2(kT 2; (kT 2); ") leads
to C 0(kT 2) = J1(kT 2; (kT 2); ") + J2(kT 2; (kT 2); "), that is to:
C 0(kT 2) = y0T 2(kT 2) + 
@
R "
RT 1(kT 2;(kT 2))(1 G(x))dx
@kT 2
+ (1  )

@P (JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); ) + F  0)
@kT 2

JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); ) + F

+ (1  )

@JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); )
@kT 2

P (JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); ) + F  0)

(8)
First, from equation (1), @J
T 1(kT 2;(kT 2);)
@kT 2 is equivalent to y
T 1
1 (kT 2; (kT 2)) +
0(kT 2)
h
yT 12 (kT 2; (kT 2))  C 0(kT 2)
i
. Let denote A this expression. It is the net
marginal return in T   1 on the training investment carried out in T   2 and is strictly
positive. Second, from the Leibniz rule, diﬀerentiating
R "
RT 1(kT 2;(kT 2))(1   G(x))dx
with respect to kT 2 leads to: A

1 G(RT 1(kT 2; (kT 2)))

. Accordingly, equation (8)
can be rewritten as:
C 0(kT 2) = y0T 2(kT 2)
+A

 [1 G(RT 1(:))] + (1  )

P (JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); ) + F  0)
	
+ (1  ) JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); ) + F  @P (JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); ) + F  0)
@kT 2

(9)
2.3 The eﬀect of the age-speciﬁc ﬁring cost on ﬁrms’ training incentives
Considering the eﬀect of F on kT 2, we explore two diﬀerent cases separately, according
to the value of the rate . This helps us to identify mechanisms at work.
13With 0(kT 2)  0.
14JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); RT 1) =  F instead of JT 2(kT 2; (kT 2); RT 2) = 0.
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No persistence of shocks ( = 1) Combining equations (9) and (4) implies:
(kT 2; F )   C 0(kT 2) + y0T 2(kT 2) + A

1 G(RT 1(:)) = 0 (10)
Diﬀerentiating equation (10) leads to @kT 2@F =  2(kT 2;F )1(kT 2;F ) where 1(kT 2; F ) is nec-
essarily negative to get an interior solution. Therefore, the impact of F on kT 2 only
depends on the sign of 2(kT 2; F ):
2(kT 2; F ) = A
"
@

1 G(RT 1(:))
@F
#
 Ag(RT 1(kT 2; (kT 2))) > 0 (11)
The impact of F (due in T  1) on kT 2 rests on the way the tax aﬀects the probability
the job does not terminate after a productivity shock. When there is no persistence of
shocks for sure, an increase in the ﬁring cost clearly rises ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in
workers’ training in T  2. This comes from a complementarity eﬀect between training and
ﬁring decisions15. In particular, ﬁrms have strong incentives to protect matches against
bad productivity shocks when a new shock will deﬁnitely hit the job and while dismissals
in the next period are subject to the tax. The training investment increases the worker’s
productivity and therefore the (intertemporal) job value, which in turns reduces the risk of
layoﬀ that would become too costly at the next period because of the tax. It is worth notic-
ing that ﬁrms’ training incentives concerns both bad and high productive jobs (determined
by the value of ) as the value of the new shock in T   1 is completely independent of its
value in T  2. Nevertheless, this unambiguous impact of F on training is not independent
of the degree of persistence of the i.i.d. shock.
Possible persistence of shock (0 <  < 1) Combining equations (9) and (4) implies:
(kT 2; F )   C 0(kT 2) + y0T 2(kT 2)
+A

 [1 G(RT 1(:))] + (1  )

P (JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); ) + F  0)
	
+ (1  ) JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); ) + F  @P (JT 1(kT 2; (kT 2); ) + F  0)
@kT 2

= 0 (12)
Again, the derivative of kT 2 has the same sign as 2(kT 2; F ):
15Chéron and Rouland (2011) show that job destructions and training investments are highly comple-
mentary since ﬁrms have strong incentives to invest in training to protect matches from idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. Expected productivity gains due to training investments rise the job tenure, which
in turn encourages ﬁrms to invest more.
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2(kT 2; F ) = Ag(RT 1(:)) + (1  )A

@P (JT 1(:) + F  0)
@F

+ (1  )

@P (JT 1(:) + F  0)
@kT 2

+ (1  )

@2P (JT 1(:) + F  0)
@kT 2@F
 
JT 1(:) + F

(13)
The last term on the right-hand side is equal to zero as the training investment in T  2
aﬀects the probability P (JT 1(k; ") +F  0) through the accumulation of human capital,
which does not depend on the tax level. Therefore, when shocks may be persistent between
periods, the eﬀect of the ﬁring cost in T   1 on the training investment in T   2 not only
depends on the positive eﬀect of the tax on the probability the job does not terminate after
a productivity shock (ﬁrst term of the right-hand side), but also on the way the training
investment itself and the ﬁring cost aﬀect the probability that the job will be robust to
ageing (second and third term of the right-hand side). This second impact is not clearly
stated. In particular, the tax may have no eﬀect on this probability that the job will be
robust to ageing considering high productive jobs for which the job is initially robust (the
job value is higher than  F from T   2). The lower the idiosyncratic productivity drawn
in T   2, the more likely the tax has an eﬀect on this probability. Overall, the lower the
persistence of shocks (i.e. the higher ), the higher ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in training
in T   2 to protect matches against bad productivity shocks. But, for low values of ,
the job productivity has to be low in order to encourage ﬁrms to engage in training. The
impact of F on kT 2 actually depends on the value of  and on the initial job productivity.
The 1999 Delalande tax change leads to increase ﬁring taxes diﬀerences in age terms by
rising the ﬁring costs of workers aged 50 and above. Following the theoretical predictions
we developed, training rates of workers aﬀected by the reform (50 and above) are not
likely to increase following the tax change. The tax change only may have an eﬀect on the
training incidence of workers below the threshold-age. But all depend on the evolution of
technology and of the initial job productivity. In the event of rapid change of technology,
training investments ensure a higher job value by increasing workers’ productivity, which in
turn reduces the risk of layoﬀ that would become too costly after 50. Training investments
help to protect matches against future bad productivity shocks. Conversely, in the event
of persistent idiosyncratic productivity, the lower the initial productivity, the higher ﬁrms’
training incentives. Next sections empirically quantify these eﬀects.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Data description
To assess the eﬀect of the Delalande tax reform on ﬁrm-provided training, we use in
this study two complementary French databases. The ﬁrst one is a cross-sectional survey
entitled “Formation Continue” conducted by INSEE (the French National Institute for
Statistics and Economic Studies) in March 2000. It was carried out on a sample of 28667
individuals. The main interest of this survey is that it includes detailed information on
training. In particular, it provides accurate information on the diﬀerent training periods
9
followed by each respondent along the life cycle. From the questionnaire, it is possible
to separate three main periods: i) from exit to school to February 1998, ii) from March
1998 to December 1998 (training in 1998 hereafter), and iii) from January 1999 to March
2000 (training in 1999 hereafter). The "Formation Continue" survey gives information
about the ﬁnancing organization. We decide to only consider ﬁrm-ﬁnanced training as the
Delalande tax reform aﬀects ﬁrms. This was the case for about 81% (80%) of the older
workers having participated in a training program in 1998 (1999). The survey also describes
the type of experienced training using four categories: i) training in a work situation, ii)
apprenticeships, iii) work placement or training courses and iv) self-training. Furthermore,
we have information about the purpose of the training activity, which has to ﬁt in one of
the following categories: i) to adapt to the job, ii) to switch to another job or to get a job,
iii) to obtain a diploma or a certiﬁcation, iv) to execute political duties, v) personal or
cultural reasons, and vi) no speciﬁc reason. When turning to the data, we choose to only
consider the ﬁrst motive since it was the result of 75% (82%) of the ﬁrm-ﬁnanced training
sessions received by employees in 1998 (1999).
We merge these data with the 1998 and 1999 waves of the French Labor Force Survey
(“Enquête Emploi”). This is a rotating panel since exactly one-third of the sample is
dropped from the sample each year and is replaced with a new, comparable sample drawn
from the current population. The size of the Enquête Emploi is about 135000 individuals
who are yearly interviewed about their situation on the labor market. The main feature
of these data is that they provide detailed information over two years for two-third of the
1998 original sample. This means that we can investigate ﬁrms training decisions before
and after the reform. Finally, for each respondent, the Enquête Emploi contains detailed
information about socio-demographic individual characteristics, as well as job and ﬁrm
characteristics.
3.2 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
We deﬁne our sample in the following way. First, we exclude farmers and self-employed as
well as individuals working in the public sector since layoﬀs are very infrequent in the public
sector. We focus on the population of respondents aged from 45 to 54 in March 199816.
Furthermore, we restrict our analysis on men to control for the distance to retirement
that determines the number of contributive years from graduation17. As the distance to
retirement is expected to have a strong impact on ﬁrm training decisions, we consider only
men in our sample. Dropping the few missing values (mainly because of missing ﬁrm sizes)
16Workers aged 55 are so close to the retirement age that we expect the reform will have no eﬀect on
their access to ﬁrm-ﬁnanced training (“horizon” eﬀect).
17Following Hairault et al. (2010), distance to retirement is captured by the diﬀerence between the
current age and the retirement age. Considering the French pension system, the retirement age can be
approximated by the required number of contributive years to get the full pension rate: the full pension
age which is exogenous to the labor market status. The distance to retirement for an individual is then
equal to the full pension age minus her current age. However, if a person enters the job market at a very
young age, she cannot retire before the eligibility age for full pension (60 years old) even though she has
accumulated the required number of contributive quarters before this age. In this case, the retirement age
is then set at 60 and the distance to retirement is 60 minus the current age. While unemployment episodes
in the French system are included in the number of contributive periods, this proxy for the retirement age
does not take into account non-continuous careers due to maternity leaves and family commitments. The
retirement age is then only relevant for male, which implies to consider only male workers in our sample
selection.
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and selecting only workers who were working both in 1998 and in 199918, we have a total
set of 1000 observations for each year. We consider the participation of these individuals
to a ﬁrm-ﬁnanced training spell while employed between March 1998 and December 1998
for the pre-reform period and between January 1999 and March 2000 for the post-reform
period.
Some descriptive statistics about the sample we use are provided in table 7 in appendix.
First, focusing either on large or small ﬁrms, there are very few diﬀerences between the
pre- and the post-reform period, except for the distance to retirement. Beyond these
diﬀerences, comparing individuals employed in ﬁrms with 50 workers or more and those
employed in ﬁrms with less than 50 workers is of particular interest to us. Not surprisingly,
the probability that the ﬁrm has a training plan is overwhelming in large related to small
ﬁrms (depending on the year, about 73% against 27%)19. Similarly, we observe that job
seniority tends to be much higher for individuals working in large ﬁrms than for those
working in small ﬁrms. Furthermore, the sectoral composition strongly depends on ﬁrms’
size as well. For instance, the building sector represents barely 6% of all the jobs in
large ﬁrms while it is about 20% in small ones. Large ﬁrms are also characterized by
the predominance of the tertiary industry while the manufacturing sector is the greatest
in small ﬁrms. Lastly, regarding the wage distribution, workers in large ﬁrms have on
average better paid jobs than workers in small ones (about 1800 euros a month against
1500 euros)20.
As these variables may strongly matter in explaining the access to ﬁrm-ﬁnanced train-
ing, the observed deviations make both groups not comparable. We have then to estimate
the causal eﬀect of the change in the Delalande tax schedule on workers’ training rate
by accounting for the diﬀerences in the distribution of covariates between both groups.
Following Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998) and Blundell and Costa Dias (2000, 2004),
we exploit the panel aspect of the data using a conditional DiD approach.
4 Quantitative analysis: Identiﬁcation strategy and results
The goal of the paper is to measure the impact of stricter employment protection among
older workers on ﬁrms’ incentives to provide training. We exploit a discontinuity in the
Delalande tax reform: in 1999, the legislation led to an increase in the tax for ﬁrms with 50
workers or more while the tax remained unchanged for ﬁrms with fewer than 50 employees.
The treatment is a unexpected one-time change in government policy and applied almost
equally to all members of the treatment group21. The one-time nature of the change makes
it easy to select speciﬁc pre- and post-treatment points in time. Consequently, we choose
18This selection allows us to use a balanced panel for estimations. However, less than 1% of individuals
employed in 1998 were ﬁred in 1999.
19This result is in line with Bassanini et al. (2007) and Montizan et al. (2010) for instance, who show
that training incidence is much higher among larger organizations.
20Table 8 in appendix gives the diﬀerence in means between both groups for each observable character-
istic. This conﬁrms results in table 7. Thus, the diﬀerence in the probability of having a company training
plan between large and small ﬁrms exceeds 0.46 for each year and for both samples for instance. Besides,
jobs in building or tertiary sector are over-represented in small organizations, while jobs in the industrial
sector represent around one third of all the jobs in large ﬁrms.
21As reported in table 1, even though the due tax doubles in most ages, the tax reform is not strictly
equally applied to all workers according to their age since it also trebles in cases. The rise is also less
signiﬁcant in oldest ages. However, given the sizeable tax reform, the eﬀect is never insigniﬁcant, so that
evaluating its impact on the whole group is not a problem.
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to use a DiD approach combined with propensity score matching for our evaluation22.
The basic intuition of the DiD approach is to study the impact of some “treatment” on the
recipients, comparing the diﬀerence in average performance of the eligible group pre- and
post-treatment relative to the performance of some control group pre- and post-treatment.
More formally, let Pi;t be a dummy variable equal to 1 if worker i has participated to a
ﬁrm-ﬁnanced training session at time t, with t 2 f1998; 1999g. Treatment and control
group are identiﬁed by the dummy variable Ti, such that Ti = 1 if the worker i is employed
in a large ﬁrm (i.e. a ﬁrm with more than 50 employees)23. A set of covariates Xi;t
assumed to aﬀect signiﬁcantly the access rate to ﬁrm-provided training is also included.
In this way, we include common training determinants such as gender, marital status,
occupation, education, nationality, job seniority, existence of a training plan in the ﬁrm.
Finally, following Hairault et al. (2010), we also include the distance to retirement in the
set of regressors.
We aim at estimating the following linear probability model:
E(Pi;t = 1) = Xi;t + Uit if t = 1998 (14)
E(Pi;t = 1) = Xi;t + iTi + Uit if t = 1999 (15)
where Ui;t is the error term assumed to be normally distributed with a mean 0. In
equation (15), i measures the eﬀect of the change in the tax schedule on the access rate
to ﬁrm-provided training of each individual i. As shown by Blundell and Costa Dias
(2000), the individual-speciﬁc component of the treatment eﬀect may diﬀer between the
treatment and the control group of individuals, making the identiﬁcation of the average
eﬀect of the treatment more diﬃcult. In this setting, a DiD approach allows us to recover
the average eﬀect of the treatment on the treated individuals (ATT eﬀect hereafter) under
certain conditions. The DiD estimator can be stated as:
DiD = [E(Pi;99 = 1jT = 1)  E(Pi;99 = 1jT = 0)] (16)
  [E(Pi;98 = 1jT = 1)  E(Pi;98 = 1jT = 0)]
In addition, we consider the following decomposition of the error term Ui;t:
Ui;t = i + t + i;t
where i stands for an individual-speciﬁc eﬀect constant over time. t represents a
common time eﬀect (or common macro eﬀect) and i;t is a temporary individual speciﬁc
eﬀect. Substituting equations (14) and (15) into (16), the DiD estimator can be expressed
in the following way:
DiD = E(ijTi = 1)
+ [E(Xi;99jTi = 1)  E(Xi;99jTi = 0) + E(Xi;98jTi = 0) E(Xi;98jTi = 1)] (17)
+ [E(i;99jTi = 1)  E(i;98jTi = 1) + E(i;98jTi = 0)  E(i;99jTi = 0)]
22Of course, DiD method and natural experiments are not the only way to evaluate the eﬀect of a
treatment. See Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) for a review of non-experimental methods for the evaluation
of social programmes.
23Workers employed in large ﬁrms but hired after 50 years old are included in the control group, together
with workers employed in small ﬁrms.
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The ﬁrst term in the right-hand side represents the ATT eﬀect. The second term stands
for the diﬀerence in means of covariates across groups (i.e. treatment and control groups)
for each year. The last term indicates the unobserved temporary individual-speciﬁc com-
ponent of the error term. It is worth noting that the DiD estimator allows to remove
unobservable individual-speciﬁc eﬀects constant over time and common time eﬀects. How-
ever, the second and the third term must equal to 0 in order the DiD estimator to provide a
consistent estimate of the ATT eﬀect. Thus, the DiD estimator is based on the identifying
assumption that, in absence of the treatment, the average outcome for the treated would
have experienced the same variation as the average outcome for the untreated (such that
without treatment DiD = 0): this is the “time invariance” assumption. Formally, this
identifying assumption writes:
E(Pi;99 = 0jT = 1; X1;99)  E(Pi;98 = 0jT = 1; X1;98) (18)
= E(Pi;99 = 0jT = 0; X0;99)  E(Pi;98 = 0jT = 0; X0;98) (19)
In the next part, we estimate the ATT eﬀect of the change in the Delalande tax schedule
on the access rate to ﬁrm-provided training, assuming time invariance through a DiD
approach. Then, we relax this assumption by re-estimating the ATT eﬀect through a
DiD regression combined with a propensity score matching procedure. Finally, we try to
identify workers’ characteristics for which the ATT is signiﬁcant and positive.
4.1 A DiD approach
We ﬁrst aim at checking whether the tax change had an eﬀect on ﬁrms’ incentives to
provide training. As in Kugler and Pica (2008), we then estimate the following linear
probability model to control for the possibility that higher training rates are the result of
changing characteristics of workers:
E(Pi;t = 1jXi;t; Ti; t) = Xi;t + 1Ti + 2t + DiD(Ti  t) + ci + Ui;t (20)
where ci is an individual eﬀect and t a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
from 1999 (ie after the reform) and zero otherwise. The interaction term between the
large ﬁrm dummy and the post-reform dummy captures the eﬀect of interest. DiD then
identiﬁes the causal eﬀect of treatment under the identifying assumption (18) resulting in
E[ui;tjPi;t] = 0.
Table 2 reports marginal eﬀects of the linear probability model using equation (20).
Column (1) reports results for the whole sample of workers aged between 45 and 54 while
column (2) gives results for workers aged between 45 and 49. First, they show a large
and statistically signiﬁcant raise in training access in large relative to small ﬁrms after the
reform was introduced. Thus, increasing employment protection of older workers through
the tax reform leads to rise by 8.3 (12.7) percentage points the training rate of workers
aged 45-54 (45-49) in large ﬁrms. The treatment eﬀect is stronger for the 45-49 age group
than for the 45-54, which just goes to prove that 50 is a fateful threshold that determines
ﬁrms’ ﬁring and training decisions. Besides, the training access rate only signiﬁcantly rises
for workers aged between 45 and 49. This result conﬁrms theoretical predictions of section
2.
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The positive and signiﬁcant ATT eﬀect for workers aged between 45 and 49 might result
from the implementation of other reforms than the change in the Delalande tax schedule.
For instance, in 1999, the French government introduced the 35-hour workweek regulation
but all French ﬁrms did not sign an agreement on working time reduction at the same time.
As shown in Aeberhardt et al. (2011), the signing date of such a regulation strongly depends
on ﬁrms size. In particular, the signing date was earlier for large ﬁrms than for small ﬁrms.
Consequently, this could have a diﬀerentiated impact on ﬁrms’ training incentives between
treated and control groups of observations. We suggest a simple test to check whether the
eﬀect of working time reduction on training rates would diﬀer across groups. In the null
hypothesis, the eﬀect would be the same between both groups and would be removed by
the DiD approach. Therefore, the DiD estimator would be signiﬁcant only for workers aged
45-49, in line with our theoretical results. In the alternative hypothesis, the eﬀect of the
switch to the 35-hour workweek would diﬀer across groups and the DiD estimator should
be signiﬁcant for all cohorts of workers. To perform this test, we estimate the same linear
probability model as in equation (20) without any selection on age, including workers aged
between 30 and 54. Results are presented in table 3. Only interaction terms DiD are
reported. This table shows that the training access rate only signiﬁcantly rises for workers
aged between 45 and 49. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The eﬀect of
the switch to the 35-hour workweek is similar between groups and is removed by the DiD
approach.
Finally, table 2 also gives information on the determinants of workers’ access to ﬁrm-
ﬁnanced training sessions. Results show that there are neither nationality nor sectoral
diﬀerences in participation. There is also no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between job seniority.
But there is a positive eﬀect of occupation on the probability of having been trained.
Thus, training is much more frequent among executives and intermediaries. As expected,
the existence of a training plan in the ﬁrm raises signiﬁcantly enrolments in training. The
higher the wage, the higher the training incidence as well. The last ﬁnding is the positive
eﬀect of the distance to retirement. That is for sure all the more proﬁtable for ﬁrms to
train older workers that they are likely to remain employed for a long time24
4.2 A DiD matching strategy
Time invariance assumption implies that the average training propensities for workers
employed in large ﬁrms would have experienced the same variation as the ones for workers
employed in small ones, had they worked in small ﬁrms as well. To be plausible, this
assumption then requires that being employed in a large ﬁrm is similar to working in a
small one. However, given diﬀerences between both groups highlighted in tables 7 and 8,
one may not be conﬁdent with the time invariance assumption. Therefore, to account for
the diﬀerences in the distribution of covariates between the treated and the control group,
we implement a conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator (CDiD), as suggested by
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998) and Blundell et al. (2000, 2004). This method
combines a propensity score matching approach with DiD such that, at each period, a
counterfactual outcome for workers employed in large ﬁrms if they were working in a
small one is estimated semiparametrically. This technique enables us to relax, relative
to standard DiD, the linear assumption when controlling for observables and to control
for unobservables exploiting the panel dimension of the data. The matching procedure
24All in all, these results are in line with Chéron, Rouland and Wolﬀ (2008) who estimate the impact of
ﬁrm-training on mobility and wages in France.
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Table 2: Results from a DiD estimation
(1) (2)
Variables Coeﬃcient Std. Err. Coeﬃcient Std. Err.
Large ﬁrms 0.042 (0.029) 0.036 (0.041)
Post-reform 0.046 (0.024) 0.016 (0.037)
Large ﬁrms * Post-reform 0.083 (0.029) 0.127 (0.045)
Intercept -0.149 (0.06) 0.004 (0.146)
In couple -0.016 (0.031) -0.05 (0.05)
No French citizenship -0.071 (0.054) -0.007 (0.085)
Education (ref: no diploma)
CAP-BEP -0.004 (0.023) 0.032 (0.035)
Baccalaureate -0.003 (0.04) 0.052 (0.058)
College degree -0.038 (0.042) 0.073 (0.068)
Distance to retirement 0.01 (0.003) -0.005 (0.085)
Job seniority (ref:  5)
6-10 years 0.004 (0.033) 0.044 (0.048)
11-20 years -0.02 (0.031) 0.011 (0.044)
More than 20 years 0.008 (0.029) 0.031 (0.041)
Occupation (ref: workers)
Executives 0.099 (0.033) 0.11 (0.042)
Intermediary 0.092 (0.027) 0.14 (0.039)
Employees 0.053 (0.04) 0.101 (0.057)
Existence of a training plan 0.128 (0.024) 0.129 (0.035)
Part-time job -0.016 (0.059) -0.048 (0.098)
Sector (ref: Building)
Industry 0.016 (0.035) 0.005 (0.053)
Services 0.054 (0.035) 0.061 (0.054)
Wages quartiles (ref: 1st quartile)
2nd quartile 0.056 (0.026) 0.064 (0.037)
3rd quartile 0.087 (0.029) 0.102 (0.042)
4th quartile 0.092 (0.036) 0.036 (0.054)
Number of observations 2000 982
R2 0.13 0.14
Pearson’s Coeﬃcient 0.322 0.326
Signiﬁcance levels: : 10% : 5% : 1%
Source: French Training Survey “Formation Continue 2000” and Labor Force Survey (waves 1998 & 1999)
Lecture: Column (1) gives results for the whole sample while column (2) gives results for the restricted
sample on age, including only workers between 45 and 49. The interaction term between “large ﬁrms”
and “post-reform” measures the DiD.
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Table 3: Results from a DiD estimation, without any selection on age
Coeﬃcient Std. Err. Number of obs.
Age group
30-34 years old 0.021 (0.044) 1060
35-39 years old 0.043 (0.041) 1158
40-44 years old 0.02 (0.044) 1145
45-49 years old 0.127   (0.043) 982
50-54 years old 0.05 (0.042) 945
Signiﬁcance levels:    : 1%
Note: Only interaction terms DiD of DiD are reported.
makes the distribution of covariates across groups comparable by building a suitable sample
control group. Besides, Smith and Todd (2005) show that the DiD matching estimator
performs the best among nonexperimental matching based estimators.
As it is the only age-group for which the Delalande tax change had an eﬀect, we
focus in this section only on workers aged between 45 and 49. We ﬁrst build a correct
sample counterpart for the missing information on the treated outcomes, had they not
been treated. This leads to re-establish the conditions of an experiment with a total
random assignment into treatment, by matching each treated observation with a similar
individual of the control group on the basis of some observable variables. In a second step,
we estimate the ATT eﬀect using a DiD regression and weighting non treated observations
according to their closeness to the treated ones in terms of a set of covariates X.
As before, Ti is the dummy variable equal to one if the agent i is employed in a ﬁrm
with more than 50 workers. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), matching is usually
carried out on the propensity to participate as a function of observable characteristics X:
e(X) = P (Ti = 1jXi), which is the propensity score. The usual assumption required to
estimate what would be the average probability of being trained of workers employed in
large ﬁrms if they were working in a small one is the conditional independence assumption:
E(Pi99 = 1jTi = 0)  E(Pi98 = 1jTi = 0) ? Tije(Xi) (21)
We use a probit model to estimate the propensity score, that is the probability of work-
ing in a large ﬁrm depending on observable covariates. These ones should ideally include
all important variables inﬂuencing this probability. The propensity score matching proved
to be successful since the goodness of ﬁt of the probits is high: on average, they correctly
predict the treatment status in approximately 78% of the cases. Results of the probit
estimates are reported in Appendix (Table 9). Not surprisingly, some observables such as
job seniority or the presence of a training plan in the ﬁrm strongly aﬀect the probability
of working in a ﬁrm with 50 workers or more. Workers employed in the industrial sector
are also more likely to work in a large ﬁrm.
Propensity score matching can be successful concerning the conditioning on observable
characteristics only if the estimated propensity scores of workers employed in large and
small ﬁrms overlap suﬃciently. We implemented a common support requirement which
led to the discarding of sixteen cases that were outside the common support region. Fi-
nally, after matching, all observable characteristics should be balanced between workers
employed in a large ﬁrm and matched comparison observations. This is illustrated below
in Figure 1, which reports the kernel density estimates of the propensity scores for workers
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employed in large ﬁrm and those employed in small ones. The matching procedure do
allows to make the distribution of covariates across groups comparable.
Figure 1: Common support of the propensity scores
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In a second step, we estimate the ATT eﬀect by using a DiD regression and implement-
ing a weight functionWij in the sample of workers employed in a small ﬁrm, relative to the
predicted propensity score e(X) of each individual i. We apply kernel matching estima-
tors. The counterfactual outcome is then estimated on the basis of a weighted average of
all workers employed in a small ﬁrm j. Denoting by DiDM the DiD matching estimator,
we can write:
DiDM = i[(E(Pi;99 = 1jTi = 1)  E(Pi;98 = 1jTi = 1)) (22)
  jWij(E(Pj;99 = 1jTi = 0)  E(Pj;98 = 1jTi = 0))]
where Wij is the weight placed on comparison observation j for individual i.
Once we make observations comparable between treated and control groups, we ﬁnd
that the change in the EPL led to an increase in the access rate to employer-provided
training of treated individuals by 11.5 points of percentage25, which is very similar to the
eﬀect we estimated using a simple DiD approach.
25The corresponding standard error is (0.041), which means that the estimate is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level.
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4.3 A diﬀerent treatment eﬀect across skill groups
Results from empirical sections have highlighted that costlier ﬁring taxes for workers above
50 and employed in large ﬁrms rise ﬁrms’ training incentives, but only the 45-49. According
to the theoretical predictions from section 2, one may wonder whether these ﬁring taxes
had a diﬀerent impact among the 45-49 depending on the skill level. Indeed, we have
shown that, in the event of persistent productivity shocks, the eﬀect of the ﬁring tax
on training rests on a simple productivity eﬀect that determines whether the tax aﬀects
the probability that the job will be robust to ageing. Considering high productive jobs
for which the job is initially robust, the tax will have no eﬀect on training incidence.
The lower the initial productivity, the more likely the tax has an eﬀect on ﬁrms’ training
incentives. Accordingly, we can expect that the 1999 Delalande tax change only had an
eﬀect on the training incidence of less productive workers. Conversely, in the event of rapid
evolution of technology, all workers maintained in employment are likely to face higher
training rates following the tax change, whatever their initial skill level. This comes from
a complementarity eﬀect between job destructions and training investments. Therefore,
we should not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences across skill groups.
One may assume that the less productive workers are also the less educated, those
whose earnings are the lowest, or else workers who have the less important jobs. Therefore,
we address these concerns by performing new estimations based on equation (20) and
decomposing by occupation, wages quartiles and education26. Again, the interaction term
between the large ﬁrm dummy and the post-reform dummy captures the eﬀect of interest
and identiﬁes the causal eﬀect of treatment. Results are presented in tables 4 to 6. They
show that the treatment eﬀect tends to be stronger for the less productive jobs, suggesting
that the evolution of technology is not so rapid. High-productive workers do not become
bad from one day to another. Therefore, training investments allow ﬁrms to increase
productivity of less productive workers who have been kept on working so that their job
will be robust to ageing. More productive workers do not need training since the expected
value of their job plus the ﬁring tax is strictly positive from the beginning. Precisely, the
tax reform leads to rise signiﬁcantly the training propensity of workers in blue-collar jobs
and employed in large ﬁrms (+14.5 percentage points) while it did not aﬀect signiﬁcantly
training incidences of others categories of workers. Workers whose earnings belong to the
second quartile are the only one to have beneﬁted from the tax reform (+8 percentage
points)27 and the 1999 tax change only had a signiﬁcant impact on workers who have no
diploma.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the eﬀect of stricter employ-
ment protection among older workers on ﬁrm’s training incentives. First, we develop a
simple model with ﬁnite working life-time, endogenous job destruction and ﬁrm’s training
investment. We show that age-speciﬁc employment protection aﬀects ﬁrms’ incentives to
engage in training only for the unprotected age group (below the threshold-age). This
26For instance, we regress a ﬁrst time equation (20) for executives, a second time for intermediaries, a
third time for employees and a fourth time for workers. Estimations are then repeated for each education
levels and each occupation dummies.
27The lowest wages are quite dissociated from productivity because of minimum wage. This may explain
why the eﬀect of the tax change is not signiﬁcant for workers among the ﬁrst quartile of wages.
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Table 4: Treatment eﬀect on training participation in large ﬁrms: diﬀerences among skill
groups (1)
Occupation Executives Intermediaries Employees Workers
Interaction term 0.085 0.146 0.108 0.145
(0.166) (0.12) (0.236) (0.064)
Number of obs. 139 259 76 508
Signiﬁcance level:  : 5%
Note: Only interaction terms DiD of DiD are reported. Other control variables are: marital status,
distance to retirement, job seniority, nationality, wages quartiles, education levels and sectoral dummies.
Table 5: Treatment eﬀect on training participation in large ﬁrms: diﬀerences among skill
groups (2)
Wages quartiles 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Interaction term -0.014 0.271 0.08 0.155
(0.077) (0.102) (0.127) (0.136)
Number of obs. 258 251 256 217
Signiﬁcance levels:  : 10%  : 5%
Note: Only interaction terms DiD of DiD are reported. Other control variables are: marital status,
distance to retirement, job seniority, nationality, education levels and sectoral and occupation dummies.
Table 6: Treatment eﬀect on training participation in large ﬁrms: diﬀerences among skill
groups (3)
Education No diploma CAP-BEP Baccalaureate College degree
Interaction term 0.152 0.122 0.145 0.144
(0.085) (0.083) (0.193) (0.192)
Number of obs. 328 443 92 119
Signiﬁcance level:  : 10%
Note: Only interaction terms DiD of DiD are reported. Other control variables are: marital status,
distance to retirement, job seniority, nationality, wages quartiles and sectoral and occupation dummies.
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comes from a complementarity eﬀect between training and job destruction. Since the ex-
pected separation cost is higher, ﬁrms have strong incentives to invest in training to protect
matches against bad productivity shocks. However, we argue that the complementarity
eﬀect matters only if the job is likely to be hit by an idiosyncratic shock at the next
period. Consequently, the eﬀect of age-speciﬁc employment protection on ﬁrms’ training
incentives strongly depends on the persistence of shocks. If there is no persistence, the lay-
oﬀ tax unambiguously increases the training incidence of workers below the threshold-age.
Conversely, in the event of persistent productivity shocks, this eﬀect is no longer clearly
stated and may depend on the initial productivity of the job. If the job is highly productive
and therefore robust to ageing even without investment in training, stricter employment
protection on older workers does not aﬀect ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in training.
We confront these theoretical predictions to French data, exploiting a change in the
Delalande tax schedule in 1999 that concerns only ﬁrms employing 50 workers or more.
We implement a conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator to remove selection bias into
treatment on observables, individual speciﬁc eﬀect constant over time and macro eﬀects
common to both groups. We ﬁnd that the increase in the Delalande tax for large ﬁrms
signiﬁcantly raised the access rate to employer-provided training of treated workers aged
45 to 49 by 11.5 points of percentage. Further, a skill-decomposition of this eﬀect shows
that the 1999 reform only had a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the training rate of
less productive workers. According to our theoretical ﬁndings, this could result from the
persistence of shocks.
As shown by Picchio and van Ours (2011), a better access to on-the-job training has
an eﬀect on the employability of workers, even for older workers. Therefore, the authors
suggest to introduce age-speciﬁc subsidies or layoﬀ taxes to stimulate job training and
to retain the employability of older workers. Nevertheless, our results show that speciﬁc
employment protection does not lead to increase ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in older work-
ers’ training due to their shorter distance to retirement. Therefore, looking at the eﬀect
of age-speciﬁc training subsidies on ﬁrm-provided training to older workers could be an
interesting issue for future work.
Further, beyond older workers, it is also an important concern for policy makers to
worry about the employability of low-skilled workers. In this respect, we have shown
that age-speciﬁc ﬁring taxes led ﬁrms to direct their training eﬀort on less productive
workers just below the threshold-age of the tax. Alternatively, it could be worth comparing
this positive eﬀect with the impact of training subsidies on ﬁrm’s incentives to train,
decomposing by skill level of workers. We could expect that such subsidies would be used
for workers who already have a strong labor market position, which would be of limited
interest.
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Table 7: Description of the sample, before and after the reform (in shares)
Pre-reform Post-reform
Large ﬁrms Small ﬁrms Large ﬁrms Small ﬁrms
Training rate 0.208 0.083 0.329 0.119
Age
45-49 0.565 0.501 0.455 0.413
50-54 0.435 0.499 0.545 0.587
Marital status
In couple 0.894 0.878 0.906 0.864
Living alone 0.106 0.122 0.094 0.136
Nationality
French 0.969 0.956 0.969 0.956
Others 0.031 0.044 0.031 0.044
Education
No diploma 0.368 0.377 0.368 0.377
CAP-BEP 0.405 0.446 0.405 0.446
Baccalaureate 0.092 0.078 0.092 0.078
College degree 0.135 0.100 0.135 0.100
Distance to retirement
5-10 years 0.316 0.377 0.404 0.479
10-15 years 0.524 0.51 0.565 0.493
More than 15 years 0.16 0.113 0.031 0.028
Job seniority
Less than 5 years 0.114 0.388 0.100 0.360
6-10 years 0.111 0.172 0.114 0.191
11-20 years 0.202 0.186 0.189 0.197
More than 20 years 0.573 0.255 0.595 0.249
Existence of a company
training plan
Yes 0.736 0.271 0.736 0.271
No 0.264 0.729 0.264 0.729
Occupation
Executives 0.175 0.133 0.180 0.144
Intermediary 0.274 0.258 0.279 0.238
Employees 0.078 0.064 0.078 0.058
Workers 0.473 0.546 0.463 0.560
Sector
Industry 0.590 0.263 0.595 0.269
Building 0.059 0.197 0.061 0.197
Services 0.351 0.540 0.344 0.535
Type of job
Full-time 0.978 0.967 0.978 0.970
Part-time 0.022 0.033 0.022 0.030
Monthly net wage 1786.9 1500.9 1807.9 1500.4
Number of observations 639 361 639 361
Source: French Labor Force Surveys (1998 & 1999) and French Training Survey (2000).
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Table 8: Diﬀerences in means of covariates between the treated and the control group
1998 1999
In couple 0.015 0.042
(0.021) (0.020)
Distance to retirement
5-10 years -0.061 -0.075
(0.031) (0.033)
10-15 years 0.015 0.072
(0.033) (0.033)
More than 15 years 0.046 0.004
(0.023) (0.011)
Job seniority
Less than 5 years -0.274 -0.260
(0.026) (0.025)
6-10 years -0.061 -0.077
(0.022) (0.023)
11-20 years 0.016 -0.007
(0.026) (0.026)
More than 20 years 0.318 0.345
(0.031) (0.031)
Training plan 0.464 0.464
(0.029) (0.029)
Occupation
Executives 0.042 0.036
(0.024) (0.025)
Intermediary 0.016 0.04
(0.029) (0.029)
Employees 0.015 0.020
(0.017) (0.017)
Workers -0.073 -0.096
(0.033) (0.033)
Sector
Industry 0.327 0.326
(0.031) (0.031)
Building -0.137 -0.136
(0.021) (0.020)
Services -0.190 -0.190
(0.032) (0.032)
Wages quartiles
1st quartile -0.174 -0.162
(0.028) (0.028)
2nd quartile -0.015 -0.024
(0.028) (0.028)
3rd quartile 0.093 0.092
(0.028) (0.029)
4th quartile 0.096 0.094
(0.028) (0.028)
Signiﬁcance levels: : 10% : 5% : 1%
Note: Only covariates for which the null hypothesis of equality of means at a 10% level can be rejected
are reported.
Source : Labor Force Survey and Training Survey (waves 1998 and 1999)
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Table 9: Estimation of the propensity score for the 45-49 years
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Err.
In couple -0.076 (0.210)
No French citizenship 0.004 (0.354)
Education (ref:No diploma)
CAP-BEP -0.291 (0.154)
Baccalaureate -0.201 (0.253)
College degree -0.077 (0.283)
Distance to retirement (ref: 10-15 years)
More than 15 years 0.141 (0.156)
Job seniority (ref: 5 years or less)
6-10 years 0.15 (0.21)
11-20 years 0.412 (0.193)
More than 20 years 0.579 (0.175)
Occupation (ref: workers)
Executives -0.116 (0.291)
Intermediary -0.134 (0.184)
Employees 0.516 (0.254)
Existence of a training plan 1.032 (0.137)
Sector (ref: building)
Industry 1.062 (0.223)
Services 0.311 (0.221)
Part-time job 0.197 (0.426)
Wage quartiles (ref:1st quartile)
2nd quartile 0.076 (0.196)
3rd quartile 0.188 (0.198)
4th quartile 0.17 (0.246)
Intercept -0.963 (0.32)
Number of observations 542
Pseudo R2 0.256
Source: Labor Force Survey (wave 1998) and Training Survey
Signiﬁcance levels: : 10% : 5% : 1%
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